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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________ 
 
RESTANI, Judge. 
 This action is before the court on appeal by the United 
States and cross-appeal by defendant Anthony Cornish a/k/a 
Jerjuan Mitchall ("Cornish").  The government contests the 
district court's determination that Cornish's prior third degree 
robbery conviction is not a "violent felony" for sentence 
enhancement purposes, while Cornish challenges the district 
court's jury instructions with regard to the stipulated fact of 
Cornish's prior felony conviction.  We find no error in the 
district court's jury instructions, but find that the district 
court did err in failing to apply the enhanced penalties provided 
by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and USSG § 4B1.4 and remand for 
resentencing. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 On April 16, 1994, two police officers were on routine 
patrol in a marked police vehicle when they observed a car being 
operated in a reckless manner.  (Supp. App. 50a-52a)  The 
officers attempted to stop the vehicle, but the vehicle reversed 
  3 
its direction and fled.  They pursued the vehicle, using their 
lights and sirens in an attempt to stop the vehicle.  (Supp. App. 
53a)  While fleeing the police, the driver of the vehicle, later 
identified as Cornish, threw a gun out of the driver's side 
window, jumped out of the vehicle, and fled on foot.  (Supp. App. 
54a)  The vehicle continued forward a short distance and came to 
rest after hitting a fence.  (Supp. App. 54a)  One officer 
recovered the weapon, a .38 caliber Colt handgun, while two 
others apprehended Cornish several blocks away as he attempted to 
climb over a fence.  (Supp. App. 54a-55a, 187a) 
 On September 21, 1994, Cornish was indicted by a federal 
grand jury on a single count of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994).1  
Following a jury trial, Cornish was found guilty on February 15, 
1995.  At the sentencing hearing, the district court held that 
Cornish's prior conviction for third degree robbery is not a 
"violent felony" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1994)2 and U.S. 
                     
     
1
  18 U.S.C. § 922(g) provides in relevant part, "[i]t shall 
be unlawful for any person-- (1) who has been convicted in any 
court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year; . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition . . . ." 
     
2     2
  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) provides in relevant part that: 
 
  In the case of a person who violates [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)] 
and has three previous convictions by any court 
referred to in [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)] for a violent 
felony . . . committed on occasions different from one 
another, such person shall be fined not more than 
$25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, the 
court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a 
probationary sentence to, such person with respect to 
the conviction under [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)]. 
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Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("USSG") § 4B1.4 (1995).  On 
November 16, 1995, Cornish was sentenced to 108 months 
incarceration, five years supervised release, and a $50 special 
assessment. 
 
 STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 As Cornish did not object to the district court's jury 
instructions below, our review is limited to plain error under 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  See United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 
1220, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 1994).  We have plenary review over the 
district court's interpretation and application of the sentencing 
guidelines to the facts found.  See United States v. Collado, 975 
F.2d 985, 990 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
 DISCUSSION 
I. 
 
 Cornish claims that the district court violated his 
constitutional rights protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
to United States Constitution when it instructed the jury to 
"accept" the stipulated fact of his prior felony conviction.  By 
so instructing the jury, Cornish argues that the court improperly 
removed that element of the crime from the jury's consideration. 
 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one will be deprived 
of liberty "without due process of law," and the Sixth Amendment 
ensures that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury."  U.S. Const. amend. V & VI.  The Supreme Court has held 
that, "these provisions require criminal convictions to rest upon 
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a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every 
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 
2313 (1995).  A necessary corollary to this rule is that, "a 
trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction 
or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict, 
regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that 
direction."  United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 
564, 572-73 (1977) (citations omitted). 
 Prior to trial, the parties entered into two stipulations.  
The first stipulation provided that, if called to testify, an 
agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms would state 
that the firearm in question was shipped or transported in 
interstate commerce.  (Supp. App. 187a-88a)  The second 
stipulation provided that Cornish was previously convicted of a 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.  
(Supp. App. 188a)  These stipulations were formally introduced 
into evidence at the close of the government's case.  (Supp. App. 
189a) 
 Prior to jury deliberations, the district court instructed 
the jury as follows: 
  The Government is required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt every essential element . . . of a crime charged 
in order to justify a verdict of guilty. 
. . . The three essential elements or necessary parts of 
this criminal charge or offense are as follows:  First, 
at the time of the offense, defendant had previously 
been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of 
more than a year.  And here it's agreed that on April 
16th, 1994, defendant had been previously convicted of 
such a crime. . . . 
  The second element is that the defendant knowingly 
possessed a firearm or gun, and the third is that 
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interstate or foreign commerce was affected to some 
degree . . . .  (Supp. App. 304-05a) 
 
The district court also instructed the jury as to various types 
of evidence:  "Evidence is the testimony of the witnesses, the 
exhibits received into evidence, and also as you know certain 
facts were agreed to by stipulation and are therefore to be 
accepted by you without any evidence."  (Supp. App. 308a) 
After a suggestion by defense counsel, the court concluded its 
charge with: 
  Of course, members of the jury, I gave you a choice of 
accepting either the Government's or the defendant's 
evidence, but I also instructed you that you can reject 
anybody's evidence.  So you really have in that sense a 
third choice.  You can accept or reject anyone's 
testimony, any of the evidence.  (Supp. App. 312a) 
 
 Cornish contends that the district court committed 
reversible error when it effectively directed a verdict for the 
government on the prior felony conviction element of the § 
922(g)(1) offense.  Cornish relies on the reasoning in the Sixth 
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 318 
(6th Cir. 1988), in which the defendant was convicted of two 
counts of bank robbery.  A security officer from each bank 
testified that the banks were federally insured.  Id.  The Sixth 
Circuit held that the district court's jury instruction that both 
banks were federally insured improperly directed a verdict in 
favor of the government on an essential element of the crime 
because the judge's conclusive statement left no room for the 
jury to believe otherwise.  Id. at 320 & n.8.  Cornish argues 
that in the present case, the district court similarly erred when 
it instructed the jury that it must "accept" the stipulated fact 
  7 
of Cornish's prior felony conviction. 
 Cornish claims that because a jury has the power to reject a 
stipulation, the appropriate jury instruction regarding 
stipulations is to the effect that the jury may, but is not 
required to, accept the stipulation as evidence and consider that 
fact as proved.  Cornish cites the Devitt and Blackmar model 
charge which provides that: 
  When the attorneys on both sides stipulate or agree as to 
the existence of a fact, you may accept the stipulation 
as evidence and regard that fact as proved.  You are 
not required to do so, however, since you are the sole 
judge of the facts. 
 
Hon. Edward J. Devitt, Hon. Charles B. Blackmar, Michael A. 
Wolff, and Kevin F. O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and 
Instructions, Civil and Criminal, § 12.03, at 333 (1992).  
Cornish argues that the district court's failure to similarly 
instruct the jury constituted a structural defect in his trial,  
requiring reversal, irrespective of the evidence or whether a 
contemporaneous objection was made. 
 The government counters that the district court's jury 
instruction did not amount to a directed verdict in favor of the 
government on an essential element of the crime as the district 
court never instructed the jury to not consider the prior felony 
conviction element.  The government contends that the court 
simply informed the jury of the three elements that required 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and accurately stated that the 
parties had agreed to the existence of a prior felony conviction. 
 The government distinguishes the Sixth Circuit's opinion in 
Mentz from the present case, in that Mentz did not involve a 
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stipulation by the parties to an element of the crime, but the 
district court's assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented on an element of the crime. 
 We note that Courts of Appeal for the Fourth and Tenth 
Circuit have recently addressed this issue in United States v. 
Muse, 83 F.3d 672 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 261 
(1996), and United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471 (10th Cir. 
1996).3  In Muse, the defendant was also prosecuted under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  83 F.3d at 673-74.  Muse argued that the 
district court erroneously instructed the jury on the effect of 
certain stipulations, similar to the stipulations in the present 
case.  Id. at 677.  The Fourth Circuit found that, "[w]hile a 
valid stipulation relieves the prosecution of the burden of 
producing any other evidence in order to establish the fact 
stipulated, it does not relieve the prosecution from the burden 
of 'proving every element of the crime' beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Id. at 679.  The court concluded that: 
  In view of the special evidentiary character of a 
stipulation--more potent than an admission but less 
draconian than a "guilty plea"--and the power of the 
jury to "acquit for any reason," developing the proper 
language for a jury instruction regarding the effect of 
stipulations as to an element of a criminal offense 
requires a trial court to walk a careful line.  The 
government is entitled to have the court inform the 
jury of the powerful effect of a stipulation but a 
court cannot direct a verdict, even a partial verdict, 
                     
     
3
  We also note that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal has 
considered this issue in United States v. Jones, 65 F.3d 520 (6th 
Cir.), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 73 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 
1995).  Although the Sixth Circuit originally held that the 
district court's jury instruction with regard to the stipulation 
that Jones was a previously convicted felon constituted 
reversible error, the Sixth Circuit has not yet issued its 
opinion en banc. 
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against the defendant. 
 
Id. at 680 (citation omitted).  While noting that no appellate 
case has set forth the proper language for a jury instruction in 
this situation, the court approvingly cited the model jury 
instructions for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits which both include 
language that, given a stipulation, the jury "should . . . treat 
[the stipulated] facts as having been proved."  Id.  The court 
then held that the district court's instruction to the jury that 
it must "consider" the elements and that it "should" find that 
the government established those elements through the 
stipulations was not erroneous.  Id. 
 The Tenth Circuit took a somewhat different approach.  
United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471 (10th Cir. 1996).  In Mason, 
the defendant was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and the 
parties stipulated to the prior felony conviction and interstate 
commerce elements of the crime.  Id. at 471-72.  On appeal, Mason 
argued that the district court improperly invaded the province of 
the jury by removing the stipulated elements from the jury's 
consideration, relying on the Sixth Circuit's opinion in United 
States v. Jones, 65 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 1995).  85 F.3d at 472.  
Finding no error in the district court's jury instructions, the 
Tenth Circuit reasoned that: 
[T]he jury need not resolve the existence of an element when 
the parties have stipulated to the facts which 
establish that element. . . . [T]he judge has not 
removed the consideration of an issue from the jury; 
the parties have.  More specifically, by stipulating to 
elemental facts, a defendant waives his right to a jury 
trial on that element. 
 
Id.  The Tenth Circuit also rejected what it deemed the 
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underlying premise in Jones--jury nullification.  Id. at 473.  
The court reasoned that although a jury in a criminal case has 
the practical power to render a verdict at odds with the evidence 
or the law, a jury does not have the lawful power to reject 
stipulated facts because such a power, if exercised, would 
conflict with the jurors' sworn duty to apply the law to the 
facts, regardless of outcome.  Id. (citing United States v. 
Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105 (11th Cir. 1983)).  In conclusion, 
the court stated that its holding "simply reaffirms that a 
defendant may waive this right to a jury determination on a 
particular issue when it is in his interest to do so."  Id. at 
474. 
 Although it is possible to waive constitutional rights, 
neither Supreme Court precedent nor the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provide clear guidance on how to accomplish properly a 
partial waiver of the right to trial by jury.  We need not 
resolve that issue, however, in this case.4 
 As noted, Cornish did not object to the jury instruction at 
trial.  Therefore, we review for plain error.  United States v. 
Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 408 (3d Cir. 1996); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 The Supreme Court has defined plain error: 
There must be an "error" that is "plain" and that"affect[s] 
substantial rights."  Moreover, Rule 52(b) leaves the 
decision to correct the forfeited error within the 
sound discretion of the Court of Appeals, and the court 
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  See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Assn., 485 
U.S. 439, 445-46 (1988) ("fundamental and longstanding principle 
of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching 
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding 
them"); United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 892 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(same). 
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should not exercise that discretion unless the error 
"seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of the judicial proceedings. 
 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quoting United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).  See also Henderson v. 
Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) ("It is the rare case in which an 
improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal 
conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court."). 
 Here, there is no doubt that Cornish was convicted of 
robbery on three prior occasions.  These satisfy the prior 
conviction element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Nor is there any doubt 
that Cornish entered into the stipulation voluntarily.  
Apparently Cornish agreed to the stipulation to shield the jury 
from hearing the factual background of his prior robbery 
convictions.  Under this set of circumstances, the district 
court's jury instruction could not have seriously affected the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial 
proceedings.  Therefore, in exercising our discretion under Rule 
52(b), we may affirm the district court. 
 We would reach the same conclusion were we to apply a 
harmless error standard because the district court's instruction 
did not affect the defendant's substantial rights and was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 24 (1967); 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).  
 As noted by the Fourth Circuit in Muse, the model jury 
instructions in some circuits require the district court to 
instruct the jury that they "should" accept as proven the facts 
to which the parties have stipulated.  See, e.g., Manual of Model 
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Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth 
Circuit (1992) § 2.03 ("The government and the defendant[s] have 
stipulated -- that is, they have agreed -- that certain facts are 
as counsel have just stated.  You should therefore treat those 
facts as having been proved."); Ninth Circuit Manual of Model 
Jury Instructions Criminal (1995) § 2.04 ("The parties have 
agreed to certain facts that have been stated to you.  You should 
therefore treat these facts as having been proved.").  These 
formulations avoid the hazard, apparent or not, of directing a 
verdict on a factual issue and would be shielded from 
constitutional challenge. 
II. 
 Prior to trial, the government filed a Notice of Defendant's 
Prior Convictions for Enhanced Sentencing Under Title 18, United 
States Code, Section 924(e) (Supp. App. 314a-15a) and attached 
certified copies of the defendant's prior convictions5 contending 
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  The government submitted certified copies of Cornish's 
three prior robbery convictions to establish the following record 
of convictions: 
 
1.  On or about November 28, 1983, in Philadelphia Common 
Pleas Court, case #8306-2147, Cornish was convicted of 
second degree felony robbery charges and sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment. 
 
2.  On or about October 25, 1984, in Philadelphia Common 
Pleas Court, case #8312-2836, Cornish was convicted of 
third degree felony robbery charges and sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment. 
 
3.  On or about July 30, 1986, in Philadelphia Common Pleas 
Court, case #8505-0939, Cornish was convicted of second 
degree felony robbery charges and sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment. 
 
(Supp. App. 314a-15a; App. 14a-21a) 
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that they constituted "violent felonies" as defined by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B).6  Cornish filed objections to the Presentence 
Investigation Report challenging the United States Probation 
Office's conclusion that he was subject to an enhanced sentence 
pursuant to § 924(e).  Cornish conceded that his convictions for 
robbery on November 28, 1983 and July 30, 1986 were "violent 
felonies" under § 924(e)(2)(B), but objected to the inclusion of 
his October 25, 1984 third degree robbery conviction as a 
"violent felony."  (Supp. App. 317a-18a)  In that instance, 
Cornish was convicted of robbery, a third degree felony pursuant 
to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3701(a)(1)(v) (West 1983).7 
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  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) Code defines a "violent 
felony" as: 
 
[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year, . . . that-- 
 
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of 
another; or 
 
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another. 
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  The Pennsylvania robbery statute provides: 
 
(a) Offense defined.-- 
  (1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of 
committing a theft, he: 
(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; 
(ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him in 
fear of immediate serious bodily injury; 
(iii) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony 
of the first or second degree; 
(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens 
another with or intentionally puts him in fear of 
immediate bodily injury; or  
(v) physically takes or removes property from the person of 
another by force however slight. 
  (2) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing a 
  14 
 The district court did not consider Cornish's conviction for 
third degree robbery a "violent felony" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e)(2)(B)(i) and thus, calculated Cornish's offense level as 
23 with a criminal history category of IV, resulting in a 
sentencing range of 100 to 124 months and an actual sentence of 
108 months incarceration.  United States v. Cornish, No. 94-378, 
at 2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1996).  Had Cornish been classified as an 
armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), his offense 
level would have been 33 with a resulting sentencing range of 235 
to 293 months and subject to a 15 year mandatory minimum.  Id.; 
see also USSG § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B).  The government challenges the 
district court's ruling that Cornish's third degree felony 
robbery conviction was not a "violent felony" and failure to 
apply the enhanced penalties of § 924(e). 
 The Supreme Court has considered the meaning of a "burglary" 
as a "violent felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) in Taylor v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 575, 577 (1990).  In Taylor, the Court 
was asked to determine whether a conviction for second-degree 
burglary under Missouri law was sufficient to qualify as a 
"violent felony."  Id. at 578.  The Court rejected the view of 
the court of appeals that Congress intended the meaning of 
"burglary" under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) to be dependent on the 
                                                                  
theft" if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(b) Grading.-- Robbery under subsection (a)(1)(iv) is a felony of 
the second degree; robbery under subsection (a)(1)(v) is a 
felony of the third degree; otherwise, it is a felony of the 
first degree. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3701. 
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definition adopted by the state of conviction.  Id. at 590.  Such 
a definition would lead to § 924(e)'s sentence enhancement to be 
applied inconsistently for the same conduct by defendants 
prosecuted in states that define burglary differently.  Id. at 
590-91.  The Court found that:  
[T]he only plausible interpretation of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is 
that, like the rest of the enhancement statute, it 
generally requires the trial court to look only to the 
fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the 
prior offense.  This categorical approach, however, may 
permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact 
of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury 
was actually required to find all the elements of 
generic burglary. 
 
Id. at 602 (footnote omitted).  In conclusion, the Court held 
that, "an offense constitutes 'burglary' for purposes of a § 
924(e) sentence enhancement if either its statutory definition 
substantially corresponds to 'generic' burglary, or the charging 
paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to find 
all the elements of generic burglary in order to convict the 
defendant."  Id. 
 This circuit has addressed the issue of what constitutes a 
"violent felony" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) in United 
States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 1103 (1991).  In Preston, the court considered whether the 
defendant's prior conviction for criminal conspiracy to commit a 
robbery constituted a "violent felony" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e).  Id. at 84.  The court approved of the use of a 
categorical approach to determine which prior convictions may be 
considered by a sentencing court under § 924(e).  Id. at 85.  The 
court noted that, "[w]hen necessary, a sentencing court may refer 
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to the relevant indictment or information papers and the jury 
instructions in the prior conviction along with the certified 
record of conviction, but the inquiry should not extend beyond 
these documents."  Id. (citation omitted).  In holding that the 
crime of conspiracy to commit robbery was a "violent felony" 
within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), the court noted that 
robbery is a "violent felony" for purposes of § 924(e).  Id. at 
86 (citing United States v. Palmer, 871 F.2d 1202, 1204 (3d Cir.) 
(federal attempted bank robbery conviction "clearly" is a 
"violent felony" under § 924(e)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890 
(1989); United States v. Dickerson, 901 F.2d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 
1990) (conviction under state robbery statute constitutes a per 
se violent felony for purposes of § 924(e)).  Because the court 
found that the elements of criminal conspiracy to commit robbery 
subsume the elements of robbery, the court held that the use of 
threat or physical force was a part of McAllister's prior 
conviction for the crime of conspiracy to commit a robbery.  
Preston, 910 F.2d at 86-87. 
 The government further claims that this circuit ruled on 
whether a Pennsylvania robbery conviction constitutes a "violent 
felony" under § 924(e) in a more recent case dealing with what 
proof is required to demonstrate the fact of prior convictions 
necessary for § 924(e).  United States v. Watkins, 54 F.3d 163 
(3d Cir. 1995).  In Watkins, the defendant argued for a per se 
rule that certified copies of the judgments of conviction should 
be required in every case before a sentencing court may determine 
that the defendant's prior convictions are "violent felonies."  
  17 
Id. at 168.  The court noted that Watson was forced to make this 
broad argument because the information in his presentence report 
enabled the district court to clearly ascertain the statutes of 
conviction, Pennsylvania's burglary and robbery statutes, 
encompass only conduct that falls within the scope of § 
924(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).  Id.  The court stated that, "[w]e have 
previously held that conviction under [18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
3701] necessarily involves the 'use or threat of physical force' 
which qualifies for ACCA treatment as a 'violent felony.'  Id. at 
168 n.2 (citing Preston, 910 F.2d at 86-87). 
 Cornish argues that Preston and Watkins are inapposite as 
neither involved a conviction for robbery in the third degree.  
Cornish states that both Preston and Watkins involved armed 
robberies, which necessarily gave rise to a risk of substantial 
bodily injury.  See Preston, 910 F.2d at 84; Watkins, 54 F.3d at 
164-65.  Cornish claims that emphasis should instead be placed on 
a case from the D.C. Circuit which dealt with a crime more 
closely resembling the third degree robbery for which he was 
convicted.  See United States v. Mathis, 963 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 
1992).  In Mathis, the court held that a robbery conviction under 
section 22-2901 of the D.C. Code did not constitute a "violent 
felony" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  Id. at 409.  The 
D.C. Code provision at issue provided that: 
  Whoever by force or violence, whether against resistance 
or by sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching, or by 
putting in fear, shall take from the person or 
immediate actual possession of another anything of 
value, is guilty of robbery . . . . 
 
Id. at 401 n.6 (citing D.C. Code Ann. § 22-2901 (1973)).  The 
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defendant, with an accomplice, robbed a woman on a moving bus by 
"sandwiching" her between them and through "stealthy seizure" 
took $30 from her purse.  Id.  The court of appeals agreed with 
the district court's interpretation of the statutory language and 
found that the statute had been specifically amended to include 
"an unlawful taking of property from the person of another, by 
sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching, without violence or 
putting in fear, and with the exercise of only sufficient force 
to accomplish the actual taking of the property."  Id. at 408 
(quoting Turner v. United States, 16 F.2d 535, 536 (D.C. Cir. 
1926)).  The court then held that "stealthy seizure" under 
section 22-2901 is not a "violent felony" within the meaning of § 
924(e), "because the proof required to satisfy the element of 
force in the local statute falls below that which Congress 
intended in enacting § 924(e)."  Id. at 409.  The court, however, 
remanded the case to the district court for an examination of the 
record of the defendant's robbery conviction (i.e., the jury 
instructions and charging papers) to see whether it satisfies the 
uniform, federal standard of "use of force" thereby qualifying as 
a "violent felony" under § 924(e).  Id. at 410. 
 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that: 
[A]ny amount of force applied to a person while committing a 
theft brings that act within the scope of robbery under 
[18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.] § 3701(1)(a)(v). . . . 
  The degree of actual force is immaterial, so long as it is 
sufficient to separate the victim from his property in, 
on or about his body. 
 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 484 A.2d 738, 741 (Pa. 1984).  In Brown, 
the defendant ran up from behind the victim, quickly grabbed her 
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purse, and ran away.  Id. at 740.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
found that the force used by Brown was a "harmful touching of the 
person, accompanied with sufficient force to compel the victim to 
part with the conscious control of her property, and supports a 
robbery conviction under § 3701."  Id. at 742.  Moreover, the 
court stated that, "[t]his conduct substantially differs from the 
case of the thief who merely takes the property of another with 
intent permanently to deprive him thereof, using no force or 
threat of force on the victim--like the pick-pocket (Chapter 39 
of the Crimes Code)."  Id.  Unlike the D.C. statute, "stealthy 
seizure" is not included in Pennsylvania's robbery statute. 
 Cornish was convicted of third degree robbery pursuant to 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3701(a)(1)(v), which requires that in the 
course of committing a theft, a person "physically takes or 
removes property from the person of another by force however 
slight."  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3701(a)(1)(v) (emphasis 
added).  Based on a literal reading of the statute, the 
interpretation of § 3701 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and 
this circuit's decisions in Watkins and Preston, we find that any 
conviction for robbery under the Pennsylvania robbery statute, 
regardless of the degree, has as an element the use of force 
against the person of another.  We hold that Cornish's conviction 
for third degree robbery is a "violent felony" pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and the district court erred in failing 
to apply the enhanced penalties of § 924(e).  Accordingly, the 
case is remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
